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Abstract. In apure exchange economy under uncertainty the traders are
willing to trade of the amounts of state-contingent commodities and they
know their expectations. Common-knowledge about these conditions among
all traders can preclude trade if the initial endowments allocation is a $\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\triangleright$
nal expectations equilibrium, even when the traders have the non-partition
structure of information without the common prior aslumption. In the proof
it plays essential role to extend the notion of arational expectations equilib-
rium and to characterize $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto optimal endowments as the equilib-
rium. From the epistemic point of view it is emphasized that the partition
structure of information for the traders plays no roles in the no trade theo
$\mathrm{r}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{m}$.
Keywords: Pure exchange economy with knowledge, Rational expecta-
tions equilibrium, No trade theorem, Ex-ante Pareto optimal, Common-
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1. Introduction
One of the purposes of this paper is to introduce apure exchange economy under
generalized information structure and to extend the notion of rational expectations
equilibria for the economy. The another purpose is to characterize an $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto
optimal endowments allocation as arational expectations equilibrium, and to extend
the no trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey (1982) in the economy under gener-
alized information structure: It is assumed that (a) the traders are willing to trade
of the amounts of state-contingent commodities, and that (b) they have rationality
such that they know their expected utilities. We shall show that common-knowledge
about (a) and (b) can preclude trade provided that the traders have
-the reflexive and transitive information;
-the subjective priors that are not common for them; and
-the strictly monotone preferences.
In their paper Milgrom and Stokey (1982) show the no trade theorem as follows: 1
Let us consider apure exchange economy with traders in uncertain environment.
Let $\Omega$ $=\Theta\cross X$ and the state of $\Omega$ consists of apair $(\theta,x)$ where 0ranging over. The paper is an extended abstract and the final form will be published elsewhere.
1 See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), Chapter 14, Subsection(14.3.3), pp. 550-553
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the contingencies on which commodities are defined. The set $\Theta$ is interpreted as the
set of payoff-relevant events; endowments and utility functions may depend on 0.
The set $X$ is interpreted as consisting of payoff-irrelevant events; these events do
not affect endowments or taste directly. It is assumed here that the contingent com-
modities are $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante ParetO-0ptimally allocated, and the traders receive information
about the state of $\Omega$ representable by information partition, and it is assumed that
the traders’ beliefs are acommon prior distribution; we call it the common prior
assumption. Now, atrading process takes place where traders try to maximize their
expected utilities. We assume that in any equilibrium of this process traders’ in-
tended trades are both jointly feasible and common knowledge among them. In this
set-up Milgrom and Stokey show that if traders are strictly risk-averse, equilibrium
trade is null.
The serious limitations of the analysis in apure exchange economy under uncer-
tainty such as Milgrom and Stokey’s are its use of the information partition structure
by which the traders receive information and of the common prior assumption. From
the epistemic point of view the information partition structure represents the trades’
knowledge: Precisely, the structure is equivalent to the standard model of knowledge
that includes the ‘factivity’ of knowledg$\dot{\mathrm{e}}\mathrm{T}$ (what is known is true) and the ‘intr0-
spection’ properties Axioms 4and 5(that we know what we do and do not know).
The postulate 5is indeed so strong that describe the hyper-rationality of traders,
and thus it is particularly objectionable. Also is the common-knowledge assumption
because the common-knowledge operator is defined by an infinite recursion of the
knowledge operators. The recent idea of ‘bounded rationality’ suggests dropping
such assumptions since real people are not complete reasoners. The common prior
assumption also seems to be problematic.
This raises the question to what extent results as the no trade theorem depend on
both common-knowledge and the information partition structure (or the equivalent
postulates of knowledge.) The answer is that results strengthen the Milgrom and
Stokey ’s theorem can be obtained in two ways: First, Tanaka (2000) investigates
the theorem on the information partition by iterated elimination reasoning instead
of common-knowledge. Secondly, in this paper we drop the hypothesis that the
initial endowments are $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto optimal and we extend the no trade theorem
to the reflexive and transitive information structure without the traders being risk-
aversion and having the common prior assumption. We show the results as follows:
In apure exchange economy under reflexive and transitive information structure,
the traders are assumed to have their subjective priors not common and to have
strictly monotone preferences. Then
Main Theorem 1. Any price system for which the initial endowments allocation
is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation can preclude trade if all the traders
commonly know that they are willing to trade of the amounts of state-contingent
commodities and if they know their expectations everywhere with respect to the price.
To prove it we extend the notion of rational expectations equilibrium for econ-
omy under uncertainty to that of economy under reflexive and transitive informa-
tion structure, and we establish the the existence theorem for the equilibrium: The
traders are further assumed to be strictly risk-averse
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Main Theorem 2. There eists a rational expectations equilibrium allocation rel-
ative to a price with respect to which the traders know their expectations everywhere.
Moreover, we show ageneralized version of fundamental theorem of welfare
economics, apart of which plays essential role in proving Main Theorem 1:
Main Theorem 3. The initial endowments allocation is $ex$-ante Pareto optimal if
and only if it is a rational expectations equilibr$\tau rium$ allocation relative to a price with
respect to which the traders are rational everywhere about their expectations.
This paper organizes as follows: In Section 2we first recall ageneralized informa-
tion structure; the $RT$-information structure, and the knowledge operator model cor-
responding to it. Secondly we introduce the economy under $RT$-infomation struc-
ture, called an economy with knowledge, which is ageneralization of an economy
under uncertainty. In Section 3we extend the notion of rational expectations equi-
librium for economy under uncertainty to that of economy with knowledge, and we
establish the fundamental theorem of welfare economics and the existence theorem
for the equilibrium. Main Theorem 1is proved as aconsequence of apart of the
fundamental theorem. At the end of this section we give the existence theorem for
the rational expectations equilibrium. In Section 4we state the generalized no trade
theorem of Milgrom and Stokey. In Section 5we remark that the X-information
structure plays an essential role in the no trade theorem.
2. The Model
Let $\Omega$ be anon-empty finite set called astate space, $N=\{1,2, \cdots,n\}$ aset of
finitely many traders, and let $2^{\Omega}$ denote the field of all subsets of $\Omega$ . Each member
of $2^{\Omega}$ is called an event and each element of $\Omega$ called astate.
2.1. Information and $\mathrm{K}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}1\mathrm{e}\mathrm{d}\mathrm{g}\mathrm{e}^{9}\sim$
An information structure { $P${ $)ieN$ is aclass of mappings $P_{i}$ of $\Omega$ into $2^{\Omega}$ . It is said
to be refleive if the following property is true:
Ref $\omega$ $\in P_{i}(\omega)$ for every $\omega$ $\in\Omega$ ,
and it is said to be transitive if the following property is true:
Trn $\xi\in P_{i}(\omega)$ implies $P_{i}(\xi)\subseteqq P_{i}(\omega)$ for all $\xi,\omega\in\Omega$ .
Given our interpretation, an trader $i$ for whom $P_{i}(\omega)\subseteqq E$ knows, in the state
$\omega$ , that some state in the event $E$ has occurred. In this case we say that at the state
$\omega$ the trader $i$ knows E. $i’ \mathrm{s}$ knowledge operator $K_{i}$ on $2^{\Omega}$ i $\mathrm{s}$ defined by
$K_{i}E=\{\omega\in\Omega|P\dot{.}(\omega)\subseteqq E\}$ . (1)
The set $P_{i}(\omega)$ will be interpreted as the set of all the states of nature that $i$ knows
to be possible at $\omega$ , and $K\{E$ will be interpreted as the set of states of nature for
which $i$ knows $E$ to be possible. We will therefore call $P_{i}i$ ’s possibility operator on
$\Omega$ and also will call P.$\cdot(\omega)$ $i’ \mathrm{s}$ possibility set at $\omega$ .
It is noted that $i’ \mathrm{s}$ knowledge operator satisfies the following properties: For
every $E$ , $F$ of $2^{\Omega}$ ,
2
$\mathrm{S}$ Bacharach (1985), Binmore (1992)
229
$\mathrm{N}$ $K_{i}\Omega=-- \mathit{0}$ and $K_{}\emptyset=\emptyset$ ;
$\mathrm{K}$ $Ki\{E\cap F$) $=K_{i}E\cap K_{i}F$ ;
$\mathrm{T}$
$\mathrm{K}\mathrm{i}\{\mathrm{E}$ ) $\subset E$. for every $E\in 2^{\Omega}$ .
4 $\mathrm{K}\mathrm{i}\{\mathrm{E}$ ) $\overline{\overline{\subseteqq}}K_{\dot{*}}(K_{i}(E))$ for every $E\in 2^{\Omega}$ .
It is also noted that the possibility operator $P_{}$ is uniquely determined by the knowl-
edge operator $K_{i}$ such as $P \dot{.}(\omega)=\bigcap_{\omega\in K:E}E$ .
The mutual knowledge operator $K_{E}$ on $2^{\Omega}$ i$\mathrm{s}$ defined by $K_{E}F= \bigcap_{:\in N}K\dot{.}F$ .
The event $K_{E}F$ is interpreted as that ‘all traders know F.’ The common-knowledge
operator $K_{C}$ is defined by the infinite recursion of knowledge operators:
$K_{C}E:=\cap\ldots\cap\dot{.}K_{1}\dot{.}K_{\dot{*}_{2}}\cdots K_{k}\dot{.}E^{3}k=1,2,\{:_{1},i_{2\prime\cdots\prime k}\}\subset N^{\cdot}$
The cornrnunal possibility operator is the mapping $M$ : $\Omegaarrow 2^{\Omega}$ defined by $M(\omega)=$
$\mathrm{r}\mathrm{u}_{\epsilon}K_{C}E$ $E$. All traders commonly know $E$ at $\omega$ if $\omega$ $\in KcE$;which is equivalent
to that $M(\omega)\subseteqq E$ .
2.2. Economy with knowledge
Apure exchange economy under uncertainty is atuple $\langle N, \Omega, (e:):\in N, (U_{}):\in N, (h.):\in N\rangle$
consisting of the following structure and interpretations: There are $l$ commodities
in each state of the state space $\Omega$ , and it is assumed that $\Omega$ is finite and that the
consumption set of trader $i$ is $\mathrm{R}_{-\{-}^{l}$ ;
$-N=\{1,2, \cdots,n\}$ is the set of $n$ traders;
$-e$: : $\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{[perp]}^{l}$ is $i’ \mathrm{s}$ endoumenb,
$-U\dot{.}$ : $\mathrm{R}^{\underline{\iota_{\mathfrak{l}}}}\cross\Omega$ $arrow \mathrm{R}$ is $i’ \mathrm{s}$ utility function;
$-\mu$:is asubjective prior on $\Omega$ for $i$ .
For simplicity it is assumed that $(\Omega,\mu.)$ is afinite probability space with $\mu$. full
$support^{4}\mathrm{f}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}$ every i $\in N$ .
Definition 1. An economy $wid\iota$ knowledge $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ is astructure $\langle \mathcal{E}, (P_{i}):\in N\rangle$ , in which
$\mathcal{E}$ is apure exchange economy under uncertainty with astate space $\Omega$ finite and
with $(P_{i})$ areflexive and transitive information structure on $\Omega$ .
We denote by $\mathcal{F}\dot{.}$ the field generated by $\{P\dot{.}(\omega)|\omega\in\Omega\}$ and by $\mathcal{F}$ the join of all
$\mathcal{F}\dot{.}(i\in N)$ ;i.e. $\mathcal{F}=\bigvee_{:\in N}\mathcal{F}_{i}$. It is noted that the atoms $\{A_{i}(\omega)|\omega\in\Omega\}$ of $\mathcal{F}_{i}$ is
the partition induced from $P\ldots$ We denote by $\{A(\omega)|\omega \in\Omega\}$ the set of all atoms
$A(\omega)$ containing $\omega$ of the field $\mathcal{F}=\vee:\in N\mathcal{F}\dot{.}$ .
By an allocation we mean aprofile $a=(a:)$ of $\mathcal{F}.\cdot$-measurable functions $a$:from
$\Omega$ into $\mathbb{R}_{\mathrm{A}}^{l}$ such that for every $\omega\in\Omega$ ,
$\sum_{i\in N}a:(\omega)\leqq\dot{.}\sum_{\in N}e:(\omega)$
.
3 That is, when $\omega$ occurs then for all $k$ and for $\mathrm{a}\mathbb{I}$ traders $i\iota$ , i2, $\ldots.i_{k}$ , it is true that $‘ i_{1}$
knows that [i2 knows that [. . . $\mathrm{i}\mathrm{k}-\mathrm{i}$ knows that $[i_{k}$ knows $X]]\ldots$ ].’ This is the iterated
notion of common-knowledge.
4 I.e., $\mu.(\omega)\neq>0$ for every $\omega$ $\in\Omega$ .
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We denote by $A$ the set of all allocations and denote by $A_{i}$ the set of all the
$\mathrm{z}’ \mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}$ components: $A$ $=\cross_{i\in N}A_{i}$ . Atrade $t$ $=(t_{i})_{i\in N}$ is aprofile of $\mathcal{F}_{i^{-}}\mathrm{m}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{b}1\mathrm{e}$
functions $t_{i}$ ffom $\Omega$ into $\mathbb{R}^{l}$ . It is said to be feasible if for all $i\in N$ and for all $\omega$ $\in\Omega$ ,
$e_{i}(\omega)+t:(\omega)\geqq 0$ ; and $\sum_{i\in N}t_{i}(\omega)\leqq 0$ .
We shall often refer to the following conditions: For every $i\in N$ ,
A-l The function $e_{i}(\cdot)$ is $\mathcal{F}_{i}$-measurable with $\sum_{i\in N}e_{i}(\omega)>\neq 0$ for all $\omega\in\Omega$ .
A-2 For each $x\in \mathbb{R}_{+}^{l}$ , the function $U\dot{.}(x, \cdot)$ is $\mathcal{F}_{i}$-measurable.
A-2 For each $\omega$ $\in\Omega$ , the function $U_{i}(\cdot,\omega)$ is strictly monotone on $\mathrm{R}_{-\mathrm{I}-}^{l}$ .
A-4 For each $\omega\in\Omega$ , the function $U_{i}(\cdot,\omega)$ is continuous, strictly quasi-concave
and $non- saturated^{5}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$.
Here it is noted that $\mathrm{A}-4$ implies to A-3.
2.3. Pareto optimality and Acceptability
We set by $\mathrm{E}_{i}[U\dot{.}(a_{i})]$ the $ex$-ante expectation defined by
$\mathrm{E}.\cdot[U_{i}(a_{i})]:=\sum_{\omega\in\Omega}U_{i}(a:(\omega),\omega)\mu\dot{.}(\omega)$
for each $a_{i}\in A_{i}$ .
The endowments (ei)\^i $N$ are said to be $ex$-ante ParetO-Optimal if there is no
allocation $(a_{i})_{i\in N}$ such that for all $i\in N$ ,
$\mathrm{E}:[U\dot{.}(a\dot{.})]\geqq \mathrm{E}_{i}[U_{i}(e:)]$ ;
and that for some $j\in N$ ,
$\mathrm{E}_{j}[U_{j}(a_{j})]$ a $\mathrm{E}_{j}[U\wedge e_{j})]$ .
Let $\mathrm{E}_{i}[U_{i}(a_{i})|P_{i}](\omega)$ denote the interirn expectation defined by
$\mathrm{E}_{:}[U\dot{.}(a\dot{.})|P_{\dot{*}}](\omega):=\sum_{\xi\in\Omega}U_{i}(a_{i}(\xi),\xi)\mu_{i}(\xi|P\dot{.}(\omega))$
.
Definition 2. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ b$\mathrm{e}$ an economy with knowledge and $t$ $=(t:)_{i\in N}$ afeasible
trade. We say that $t\dot{.}$ is acceptable for $i$ at state $\omega$ provided that
$\mathrm{E}_{i}[U_{i}(t_{i}+e_{i})|P_{i}](\omega)\geqq \mathrm{E}_{i}[U_{i}(e:)|P_{i}](\omega)$ .
Denote by $A\varphi(t_{i})$ the set of all the states in which $t_{i}$ is acceptable for $i$ , and by
Act(t) $)$ the intersection $\bigcap_{i\in N}A\varphi(ti)$ .
3. Rational Expectations Equilibrium
In this section we extend the notion of rational expectations equilibrium for an
economy under uncertainty to that for an economy with knowledge. We show the
fundamental theorem of welfare economics concerning about the relationship be-
tween $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto optimal allocations and rational expectations equilibria.
5 I.e.; For any $x\in \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ there exists an $x’\in \mathrm{R}_{+}^{\mathrm{t}}$ such that U.$\cdot$ $(x’, \omega)$ $\neq>U.\cdot(x,\omega)$ .
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3.1. Price system and rational expectations equilibrium
Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}=\langle N, \Omega, (e:):\in N, (U.\cdot):\in N, (\mu:):\in N, (P.\cdot):\in N\rangle$ be apure exchange economy
with knowledge. Aprice system is anon-zero function $p:\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ . We denote by
$\sigma(p)$ the set of all atoms of the smallest field that $p$ is measurable, and by $\sigma(p)(\omega)$
the component containing $\omega$ . The budget set of atrader :at astate $\omega$ for aprice
system $p$ is defined by
$B_{:}(\omega,p)=\{a\in \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}|p(\omega)\cdot a\leqq p(\omega)\cdot e:(\omega)\}$ .
Let $\sigma(p)\cap P\dot{.}$ : $\Omega$ $arrow 2^{\Omega}$ be defined by $(\sigma(p)\cap P_{})(\omega):=\sigma(p)(\omega)\cap P_{}(\omega)$;it is
plainly observed that $\sigma(p)\cap P_{}$ is areflexive and transitive information structure of
trader $i$ . We denote by $\sigma(p)\vee \mathcal{F}4$ the field generated by $(\sigma(p)\cap P_{})$ and denote by
$A_{i}(p)(\omega)=\sigma(p)\cap A:(\omega)$ the atom containing $\omega$ .
Definition 3. Arational expectations equilibrium for an economy $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ with knowl-
edge is apair $(p,x)$ , in which $p$ is aprice system and $x$ $=(x:):\in N$ is an allocation
satisfying the following conditions:
$\mathrm{R}\mathrm{E}1$ For every $i\in Nx$:is $\sigma(p)\vee \mathcal{F}.\cdot$-measurable.
$\mathrm{R}\mathrm{E}2$ For every $i\in N$ and for every $\omega\in\Omega$ , $x:(\omega)\in B_{:}(\omega,p)$ .
RE 3 For all $i\in N$ , if $y_{i}$ : $\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}$ is $\sigma(p)\vee \mathcal{F}.\cdot$-measurable with $y:(\omega)\in B_{:}(\omega,p)$
for all $\omega$ $\in\Omega$ , then
$\mathrm{E}_{:}[U.\cdot(X:)|\sigma(p)\cap P_{}](\omega)\geqq \mathrm{E}_{:}[U_{}(y_{})|\sigma(p)\cap P\dot{.}](\omega)$
pointwise on $\Omega$ .
The profile x $=(x:):\in N$ is called arational expectations equilibrium allocation.
We denote by $R.(p)$ the event that $i$ is rational about his expectation; i.e.,
$R.(p)=\{\omega\in\Omega |(\sigma(p)\cap P.\cdot)(\omega)\subseteqq[\mathrm{R}.[U_{}(\cdot)|\sigma(p)\cap P_{}](\omega)]\}$
and denote by $R(p)$ the event that all traders are rational: i.e., $R(p)= \bigcap_{i\in N}R.(p)$ .
Definition 4. Atrader $i$ is said to be rational about his expectation with respect
to price system $p$ at $\omega$ if \mbox{\boldmath $\omega$}\in R%(p). And all traders are rational everywhere about
their expectations if $R(p)=\Omega$ .
3.2. Fundamental Theorem in Welfare Economics
We establish ageneralized version of the fundamental theorem of welfare economics
for initial endowments in the economy with knowledge (Propositions 2and 3), and
Proposition 1below is also akey to proving Main Theorem 1:
Proposition 1. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}b$ an economy with knowledge satisfying the conditions
A-l, A-2 and A-3. Then the initial endowments allocation $e=(e:):\in N$ is ex-ante
Pareto optimal if it is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation relative to some
price system $p$ with respect to which all traders are rational everywhere about their
expectations
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The next proposition states that the converse in Proposition 1is also valid under
the additional assumption that the traders are strictly risk-averse for traders:
Proposition 2. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ be an economy ettith knowledge satisfying the conditions A-
1, A-2 and A-4. If the initial endowments allocation $e=(e_{i})_{i\in N}$ is ex-ante-Pareto
optimal then it is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation relative to some
price system $p$ with respect to which all traders are rational every where about their
expectations.
Proof. For each $\omega\in\Omega$ we denote by $G(\omega)$ the set of all vectors $\sum_{i\in N}e_{i}(\omega)$ -
$\sum_{i\in N}y_{i}$ such that $y_{i}\in \mathrm{R}_{\mathrm{T}}^{l}|$ and $U_{i}(y_{i},\omega)\geqq U_{i}(e_{i}(\omega),\omega)$ for all $i\in N$ .
First, in view of the conditions A-l, A-2 and A-4 we note that that $G(\omega)$ is
convex and closed in $\mathbb{R}_{+}^{l}$ . We can establish the proposition in observing the following
three points: First
Claim 1: For each $\omega\in\Omega$ there exists $p^{*}(\omega)\in \mathbb{R}_{+}^{l}$ such that $p^{*}(\omega)\cdot$ $v\leqq 0$ for all
$v\in G(\omega)$ .
Secondly, let $p$ be the price system defined as follows: For each $\omega\in\Omega$ and for
all $\xi\in A(\omega)$ , $p(\xi):=p^{*}(\omega)$ . We can show
Claim 2: The pair $(p, (e:)_{i\in N})$ is arational expectations equilibrium for $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ .
Finally, it is observed that all traders are rational with respect to the price $p$ . $\square$
3.3. Main Theorem 3
We now state Main Theorem 3explicitly as follows:
Theorem 1. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ $be$ an economy $with$ knowledge satisfying the conditions A-l,
A-2 and A-4. The initial endowments allocation is $ex$-ante Pareto optimal if and
only if it is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation relative to $a$ $p\tau\dot{\mathrm{v}}ce$ with
respect to which the traders are rational everywhere about their expectations.
Proof. Follows immediately from Propositions 1and 2.
The following remark has been already proved in the proof of Proposition 1:
Remark 1. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ be apure exchange economy with knowledge satisfying the
conditions A-l, A-2 and A-3. If the allocation of initial endowments $e=(e_{i})_{\dot{*}\in N}$
is arational expectations equilibrium allocation relative to some price system $p$ with
respect to which all traders are rational every where about their expectations then
the pair $(p(\omega), (e:(\omega))_{i\in N})$ constitutes an $ex$-post competitive equilibrium for the
pure exchange economy $\mathcal{E}^{K}(\omega)$ with complete information for each $\omega\in\Omega$ .
3.4. Existence Theorem
It will well end this section in giving the explicit statement of Main Theorem 2:
The existence theorem of rational expectations equilibrium for an economy with
knowledge.
Theorem 2. Suppose a pure exchange economy with knowledge satisfies the condi-
tions A-l, A-2 and A-4. If the initial endowments allocation $e=(e:)_{i\in N}$ satisfies
the additional condition that $e_{i}(\omega)\neq>0$ for all $\omega\in\Omega$ and for each $i\in N$ then there
eists $.a$ rational expectations equilibrium for the economy such that all traders are
rational about their expectations with respect to the price
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4. No Trade Theorem
In this section we shall give two extensions of the no trade theorem of Milgrom and
Stokey (1982): First we give the below theorem that directly extends the no trade
theorem to an economy with knowledge, and secondly we give Main Theorem 1.
4.1. Theorem of Milgrom and Stodcy
Theorem 3. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ be an economy with knowledge satisfying the conditions A-l,
A-2 and A-3, and let $t$ $=(t:):\in N$ be a feasible trade. Suppose that the initial en-
doeryments allocation $(e:):\in N$ is $ex$-ante ParetO-Optimal. Then the traders can never
agree to any non null trade at each state where they commonly know both the ac-
ceptable trade $t=(t:)$ and rationality of their expectations; that is, $t(\omega)=0$ at
every $\omega\in K_{C}(Ad(t) \cap R)$ .
Proof. Follows from the key lemma below.
Lemma 1. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ , t $=(t:)_{\dot{*}\in N}$ and $(e:):\in N$ be the same as in Theorem 3. If
$\omega\in K_{C}(A\varphi(t:)\cap \mathrm{R}\mathrm{i})$ for each i $\in N$ then the equality is true:
$\mathrm{E}_{:}[U\dot{.}(t^{*}\dot{.}+\mathrm{q}.)|P_{}](\omega)=\mathrm{E}:[U.\cdot(\mathrm{q}.)|P.\cdot](\omega)$, (2)
where the trade $t^{*}=(t^{*}.\cdot):\in N$ is defined by
$t^{*}.\cdot(\xi):=\{$
$t_{:}(\xi)$ $\dot{l}f\xi\in M(\omega)$ ,
0if not
(3)
4.2. Rational expectations equilibrium and No trade theorem
It is interesting to consider what can be said if we drop the hypothesis that the
endowments are $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto optimal in Theorem 3. Is the no trade theorem still
true if the endowments allocation is rational expectations equilibrium aUocations?
We shall give an affirmative answer. To state it explicitly we introduce the knowledge
operator $K^{(p)}\dot{.}$ on $2^{\Omega}$ induced from the information structure $\sigma(p)\cap P_{}$ ; which is
defined by
$K^{(p)}.\cdot(E)=\{\omega\in\Omega|(\sigma(p)\cap P_{})(\omega)\subseteqq E\}$ ,
and let $K_{C}^{(p)}$ be the common-knowledge operator defined by the infinite recursion of
the operators $\{K^{(\mathrm{p})}\dot{.}\}:\in N\cdot 6$ We can now explicitly state Main Theorem 1as follows:
Theorem 4. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}$ be an economy with knowledge satisfying the conditions A-l,
A-2 and A-3, If $e=(e:):\in N$ is a rational expectations equilibrium allocation relative
to some price system $p$ with respect to which all traders are rational everywhere about
their expectations, then the traders can never agree to any non null trade at each
state where they commonly know both the acceptable feasible trade $t=(t:):\in Nj$ that
is, $t(\omega)=\mathrm{O}$ at every $\omega\in K_{C}^{(\mathrm{p})}$ (Act(t)).
6 That is, $K_{C}^{(p)}E:= \bigcap_{k=1,2},\ldots\bigcap_{\{:::\}}1,2,\ldots,k\subset NK_{i_{1}}^{(p)}K_{_{2}}^{(\mathrm{p})}\cdots K_{_{k}}^{(p)}E$ .
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Proof. Consider now the economic with knowledge
$\mathcal{E}^{K(p)}=\langle N, \Omega, (e_{i})_{i\in N}, (U_{i})_{i\in N}, (\mu_{i})_{i\in N}, (\sigma(p)\cap P_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ .
By the similar argument in the proof of Theorem 3it can be plainly observed
that $t(\omega)=0$ at every cv $\in K_{C}^{(p)}$ (Act(t ) if $e$ is $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto optimal, and $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{h}\mathrm{u}\mathrm{s}\square$
Theorem 4follows from Proposition 1.
5. Concluding Remarks
Our real concern is to what extent the no trade theorem of Milgrom and Stokey
(1982) depends on the information partition and on the hypothesis that the initial
endowments are $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto optimal. As we have observed, the reflexivity and
transitivity of information structure can preclude trade if the traders commonly
know that they are willing to trade of the amounts of state-contingent commodities.
Both the information partition and the strictly risk-aversion for the traders of the
amounts of commodities play no roles in the no trade theorem.
Could we prove the theorem under the generalized information structure jet-
tisoning the reflexivity or the $\mathrm{t}\mathrm{r}\mathrm{a}\mathrm{n}\mathrm{s}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{i}\mathrm{t}\mathrm{y}^{7}$ The following two examples show that
the reflexivity Ref and the transitivity Trn of the information structure (or the
equivalent postulates Axioms 4and T) do play an essential role.
Example 1. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}=\langle N, \Omega, (e_{i}):\in N, (U_{i})_{i\in N},\mu, (P_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ the economy with knowl-
edge in which $N$, $\Omega$ , $e:$ , $U\dot{.}$ are the same in Section ??, and
$- \mu(\omega)=\frac{1}{2}$ for each $\omega\in\Omega$ ;
$-P_{i}$ is defined by
$P_{1}(\omega):=\{\omega_{2}\}$ and $P_{9,\sim},(\omega):=\{\omega_{1}\}$
for each ci $\in\Omega$ .
It is plainly observed the two points: First that both $P_{i}$ $(i=1, 2)$ are not reflexive
but transitive, and second that the endowments $(e_{i})_{i=1},\underline’$ are both $\mathrm{e}\mathrm{x}$-ante Pareto
optimal. Let $t=(t:):=1,2$ be the feasible non-zero trade defined by
$t_{1}(\omega):=\{$




0if $\omega$ $=\omega_{-}’$ .
Then it can be verified that Act(t) $=R=\Omega$ and thus $Kc(Act(t)\cap R)=\Omega$ . $\mathrm{H}\mathrm{o}\mathrm{w}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{v}\mathrm{e}\mathrm{r}\square$
the trade $t$ is not null at $\omega_{1}\in K\mathrm{c}\{A\mathrm{c}\mathrm{t}(t)\cap R)$ .
Example 2. Let $\mathcal{E}^{K}=\langle N, \Omega, (e:)_{i\in N}, (U\dot{.})_{i\in N}, \mu, (P_{i})_{i\in N}\rangle$ the economy with knowl-
edge in which $N$, $e_{i}$ are the same in Section ??, and
$-\Omega$ $=\{\omega_{1},\omega_{\sim}"\omega_{3}\}$
$-\mu(\omega)=31$ for each $\omega\in\Omega$ ;
$-U_{i}$ : $\mathrm{R}_{+}^{l}\cross\Omegaarrow \mathrm{R}$ is defined by
Ui $(x,\omega)=(x+1)^{\mathrm{o}}\sim$ and $U_{-},(x,\omega)=\sqrt{x+3}$;
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$-P_{i}$ is defined by
$P_{1}(\omega):=\{$
$\{\omega_{1}\}$ if $\omega$ $=\omega_{1}$
$\{\omega_{2},\omega_{3}\}$ if $\omega$ $=\omega_{\sim}’ \mathrm{o}\mathrm{r}\omega_{3}$
$P_{2}(\omega):=\{$
$\{\omega_{1},\omega_{3}\}$ if $\omega$ $=\omega_{1}$
$\{\omega_{2},\omega_{3}\}$ if $\omega=\omega_{2}$ or $\omega_{3}$ .
It is plainly observed that $P_{\underline{9}}$ are reflexive and not transitive. Let $t$ $=(t:):=1,2$
be the feasible non-zero trade defined by
$t_{1}(\omega):=\{$
1if $\omega$ $=\omega_{1}$ or $\omega_{2}$
-1.5 if $\omega$ $=\omega_{3}$
$t_{2}(\omega):=\{$
-1 if $\omega=\omega_{1}$ or $\omega_{-}$’
1.5 if $\omega=\omega_{3}$ .
Then it folows that Act(t) $=R=\Omega$ and $K_{C}$ Act(t) $\cap R)=\Omega$ . However the trade
$t$ is not null at any $\omega\in K_{C}(Act(t)\cap R)$ . Cl
Nevertheless, common-knowledge of the acceptance of feasible trades seems a
rather strong assumption. Could not we get away with less, say with mutual knowl-
edge? The answer is no again: For the counter example see Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991, p.552).
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